腦內肌肉鍛鍊 Brain Gymnastics

這幾天讀完兩本非常艱澀的書，這兩本書從開始讀到讀完應該有兩個月，中間斷斷續續有去讀別的書，因為這兩本書實在很難一口氣讀完。

In recent days, I finished reading two very challenging books. It took me about two months to finish these two books, with intermittent breaks to read other books because these two were quite difficult to read in one go.

這兩本書是：

The two books are:

專業守門人與公司治理(Gatekeepers: The Professions and Corporate Governance)　／　 John C. Coffee Jr.

如何「無所事事」：一種對注意力經濟的抵抗(How to Do Nothing: Resisting the Attention Economy)　／　Jenny Odell

《專業守門人與公司治理》是因為我想閱讀關於公司治理的書籍，在圖書館的搜尋引擎隨意找到的書。在我翻開書之後我才知道，原來這是關於審計的法學叢書。

I stumbled upon “Gatekeepers: The Professions and Corporate Governance" because I wanted to read books about corporate governance. I found it randomly through the library’s search engine. Only after flipping through the book did I realize that it was actually about auditing in the legal context.

美國國會在安隆醜聞案、世界通訊案等財務詐欺、審計失敗的事件爆發後，制定了《沙賓法案》(Sarbanes-Oxley Act)，這本書即是在《沙賓法案》制定後推出的書。作者很詳盡地爬梳專業守門人(簽證會計師、律師、證券分析師、評等機構)和美國證券相關法律的歷史、執業職責的變遷和缺失。並且用安隆醜聞案、世界通訊案等事件來說明守門人失靈的前因後果。

The book delves into the history of professional gatekeepers (auditors, lawyers, securities analysts, rating agencies) and the evolution and deficiencies of U.S. securities laws. It extensively covers events like the Enron scandal and the WorldCom case to illustrate the failures of gatekeepers.

這是我第一次碰觸此類型的書，所以閱讀這本書對於我來說，像是在運用平常沒用到的肌肉般，十分吃力。不會讀不懂作者想表達的觀點，但因為作者提到的每一個資訊，對我來說都是初次接觸，我對於那些資訊的理解不會高於字面上的理解，因此只能很淺薄地吸收書中寶貴的知識。

This was my first encounter with this type of book, so reading it felt like exercising muscles I rarely use. While I could understand the author’s points, each piece of information mentioned was new to me. My understanding of these concepts couldn’t go beyond surface-level comprehension, so I could only absorb the knowledge in a shallow manner.

書中我印象最深的段落是關於安隆醜聞案的爆發經過：

One of the most memorable passages in the book was about the unfolding of the Enron scandal:

• 紐約時報記者Kurt Eichenwald對安隆事件製作詳細報導，其中揭露更多有關審計委員會消極被動之證據。1980年代末期，安隆曾爆發一樁醜聞，安隆內部稽核人員發現兩位石油交易員盜用公司資金，且遠超過其交易限制。稽核人員準備一份詳細報告，但該報告卻從未到達董事會。相反地，高階經理人取消其調查並轉請安達信事務所進行調查。相較於該份從未到達審計委員會之報告，安達信事務所準備一份輕描淡寫的調查報告。該粉飾報告暗指問題似已妥善解決，因此審計委員會閱讀該報告後，無任何處置。事實上，上述未授權交易仍然持續，安隆隨後因該交易員超過其授權權限進行交易而損失8,500萬美元。安隆執行長Kenneth Lay不想失去兩位過去獲利極高之石油交易員，因而在審計委員會前隱匿此事。此案例顯示審計委員會經常受專業顧問蒙蔽，其僅提供公司管理階層願意讓審計委員會受領之資訊。
  
  New York Times reporter Kurt Eichenwald produced detailed coverage of the Enron scandal, revealing more evidence of the passive role of the audit committee. In the late 1980s, Enron faced a scandal where two oil traders embezzled company funds, far exceeding their trading limits. Internal auditors prepared a detailed report, but it never reached the board of directors. Instead, senior management canceled the investigation and commissioned Arthur Andersen to conduct it. Compared to the report that never reached the audit committee, Arthur Andersen prepared a whitewashed investigation report. The sanitized report suggested that the problem had been resolved, so the audit committee took no action after reading it. In fact, the unauthorized transactions continued, and Enron later lost $85 million due to trades made by these traders beyond their authorized limits. CEO Kenneth Lay didn’t want to lose two highly profitable oil traders and concealed the matter from the audit committee. This case illustrates how often audit committees are blinded by professional consultants, who only provide information that management is willing to share with the audit committee.

• 發現安隆造假之英雄並非有著極高聲譽資本或需承擔高風險責任之守門人，而是完全不在乎公益之投機交易者，因自身利益所驅使及高報酬之期待，其推論出安隆必是個一推即倒的紙牌屋，並慢慢將此訊息散布他人。Jim Chanos是一名專業交易商，經營一家專門操作短線交易之公司Kynikos Associates，Chanos是第一個發現安隆重大風險之人。分析安隆之公告財務報表後，Chanos判斷安隆事實上是一家「偽裝的對沖基金」。其發現安隆雖然承擔極高風險，但卻僅賺取非常微薄之利潤，僅有其資本額之7%，其明瞭此一低比率之盈餘並無法支撐安隆當時高達帳面價值六倍之估價。此外，安隆大量的關係人交易也暗示產生詐欺及自己交易行為。
  
  The hero who uncovered Enron’s fraud wasn’t a gatekeeper with high reputation capital or high-risk liability but a speculator who didn’t care about the public good. Motivated by self-interest and high return expectations, he inferred that Enron must be a house of cards ready to collapse and gradually spread this message to others. Jim Chanos, a professional trader who ran a short-selling firm called Kynikos Associates, was the first to discover significant risks at Enron. After analyzing Enron’s financial statements, Chanos concluded that Enron was essentially a “hedge fund in disguise." He discovered that despite taking extremely high risks, Enron only made very meager profits, just 7% of its capital, and realized that this low earnings rate couldn’t support Enron’s valuation, which was six times its book value at the time. Additionally, the large volume of related-party transactions at Enron implied fraudulent and self-dealing behavior.

• 即使獨立審查人發現安隆之揭露文件有問題，亦無任何獨立守門人擁有足夠權限阻擋。因缺乏監督，安隆管理階層發現要「減少關係人交易之揭露」是相對容易的。安隆關係人交易之資訊揭露，是由安隆全球財務部門之經理人及職員所控制，而非最終需要負責之高階管理階層，包括法務部門、外部法律顧問或審計及法規遵循委員會。安隆在資訊揭露上所缺乏之透明度，似乎較少歸因於守門人失靈，而較多歸因在資訊揭露過程中缺乏真正擁有權力及責任之守門人。安隆案中所缺乏的是一個獨立專業人士，不論是律師或會計師，依其地位得以「對公司之報告執行獨立審查」。
  
  Even if the independent auditor found issues with Enron’s disclosures, there were no independent gatekeepers with sufficient authority to block them. Due to the lack of oversight, Enron’s management found it relatively easy to “manage down" disclosures of related-party transactions. The information disclosure on related-party transactions at Enron was controlled by managers and staff of Enron’s global finance department, rather than by the ultimate responsible senior management, including the legal department, external legal advisors, or the audit and compliance committee. The lack of transparency in information disclosure at Enron seemed to be less due to gatekeeper failures and more due to the lack of truly empowered gatekeepers in the information disclosure process. What was missing in the Enron case was an independent professional who, whether a lawyer or an accountant, could “conduct independent review of the company’s disclosures."

• 2001年2月，Chanos在一個全美短線交易商之研討會中發表演說，並將安隆列為兩支其所選出即將暴跌之股票之一。財星雜誌記者Bethany McLean在Chanos提供資訊下撰寫一篇當下非常有名之財星專欄文章「安隆的股價被高估了嗎？」(Is Enron Overpriced?)該文成功改變大眾對安隆之觀點，安隆股價開始逐漸下滑，安隆當時之執行長Jeff Skilling於2001年8月無預警辭職時，安隆股價更是快速下跌。
  
  In February 2001, Chanos spoke at a seminar for short-sellers across the United States and listed Enron as one of two stocks he had selected to plummet. Fortune magazine reporter Bethany McLean wrote a famous Fortune column titled “Is Enron Overpriced?" based on information provided by Chanos. This article successfully changed public perception of Enron, and its stock price began to decline gradually. When Enron’s CEO Jeff Skilling unexpectedly resigned in August 2001, Enron’s stock price plummeted even further.

• 從眾效應供為利益衝突：經濟學家認為比起集體預測錯誤，基金經理人及分析師更畏懼個人失誤，因為彼此間相互競爭，而且主要依相對績效予以評價。因此證券分析師及基金經理人傾向於從眾，畏懼重大偏離於共同預測。如果共同預測錯誤，與作相同預測之同事相對，遭受輕微傷害。即使分析師能準確預測公司盈餘或股價下滑，問題仍然存在，因為如果太早預測衰退，市場卻未立即下跌，相信該分析師判斷之投資人可能會因而遭受損失，最終結果證明，即使該分析師預測正確，亦無法安撫投資人。預測之精準度對分析師職涯前途並無增進，反倒是樂觀預測，即使有著系統性錯誤，對分析師職涯更有利。此可以說明為何2001年10月安隆破產兩個月前，17位追蹤安隆之分析師，有16位維持買進或強烈建議買進之投資建議。即使當時公開可得資訊已顯示安隆股價已被高估，且無法繼續維持先前的成長率。
  
  The herd effect creates conflicts of interest: economists believe that fund managers and analysts fear individual mistakes more than collective forecasting errors because they compete with each other and are primarily evaluated based on relative performance. Therefore, analysts and fund managers tend to herd, fearing significant deviations from common forecasts. If the common forecast is wrong, they suffer only minor damage compared to colleagues who made the same forecast. Even if an analyst accurately predicts a company’s earnings or stock price decline, there’s still a problem. If the analyst predicts a downturn too early and the market doesn’t immediately decline, investors who trust the analyst’s judgment may suffer losses, proving that even if the analyst’s prediction is correct, it can’t appease investors. Accuracy of prediction does not enhance an analyst’s career prospects; instead, optimistic forecasts, even with systematic errors, are more favorable for an analyst’s career. This explains why, two months before Enron’s bankruptcy in October 2001, 16 out of 17 analysts tracking Enron maintained buy or strong buy recommendations. Even though publicly available information already indicated that Enron’s stock price was overvalued and couldn’t sustain its previous growth rate.

書中對於會計師事務所的事業重心移轉間接造成的審計失靈也多有著墨，這是我以往不知道的事情。

The book also extensively covers the shift in focus of accounting firms’ practices, indirectly resulting in audit failures. This was something I wasn’t aware of before.

• 顧問業務獲利遠勝簽證業務，顧問開始在事務所內取得更大主導地位，1989年事務所最終依據顧問部門之要求而正式分割會計業務與顧問業務於不同事業單位。1998年，安達信制定新的指導方針，依該方針，為客戶執行簽證業務之合夥人將被期待透過交叉銷售非簽證服務，從該客戶獲得雙倍之顧問收入。為達到交叉銷售之要求，簽證會計師合夥人只能被迫自守門人轉至業務員導向。
  
  Consultancy services became significantly more profitable than audit services, leading consultancy to take on a greater role within accounting firms. In 1989, responding to the demand from the consultancy division, firms formally separated their accounting and consultancy businesses into distinct units. By 1998, Andersen had devised new guidelines where partners performing audit services for clients were expected to generate double the consultancy revenue by cross-selling non-audit services. To meet this cross-selling requirement, audit partners were compelled to transition from gatekeepers to sales-oriented professionals.

• 為何安達信已清楚意識世界通訊詐欺的可能性，卻未深入調查？破產審查人Thornburgh提出：「安達信之所以無法查知詐欺，可能因其極度渴望向世界通訊發展非簽證業務關係。基於如此想法，安達信自然寧願選擇相信管理階層之陳述，而非加強報表文件之查證工作，增加查核簽證所致生之時間及費用，可能使彼此間商業關係緊張。」
  
  Despite Andersen’s awareness of the potential for fraud at WorldCom, why did they not investigate more deeply? Bankruptcy examiner Thornburgh suggests, “Andersen’s failure to uncover the fraud may stem from its strong desire to develop non-audit business relationships with WorldCom. With this mindset, Andersen may have preferred to believe management statements rather than intensify verification of financial statements, which would increase the time and cost of audit engagements, potentially straining business relationships."

• 會計師事務所對於收取高額顧問費用之期待，會使其默許任何可能帶來顧問服務收入之客戶的要求。簽證收入相對平穩，其他領域之顧問收入卻可能倍數成長，因此事務所改變其商業模式，使用獎勵獎金以鼓勵其會計師推銷事務所之顧問服務。
  
  High expectations of earning substantial consultancy fees might lead accounting firms to acquiesce to any requests from clients that could generate consultancy service revenue. While audit revenue remained relatively stable, consultancy revenue in other areas could multiply. Consequently, firms shifted their business models, using bonus incentives to encourage accountants to promote the firm’s consultancy services.

• 1980年度顧問服務收入迅速增加，在當時八大會計師事務所中自11%增加至1984年28%，安達信會計師事務所在那時已是美國最大的財務諮詢顧問事務所，八大事務所中六大事務所之營收也位列美國十大財務諮詢顧問公司，到80年代末期，安達信會計師事務所之顧問業務已達總體收入44%。
  
  Consultancy service revenue saw rapid growth in the 1980s, rising from 11% to 28% among the Big Eight accounting firms, with Andersen already being the largest financial consulting firm in the United States by 1984. Six of the eight firms ranked among the top ten financial consulting companies in the U.S. By the late 1980s, consultancy services accounted for 44% of Andersen’s total revenue.

• 1990年代末期，Ernst & Young會計師事務所當時所設定業務目標，期望每個簽證會計師合夥人對簽證客戶推銷相關非簽證服務，若未能達到設定之業績目標，將自動減薪10%；安達信事務所也在1998年對簽證會計師合夥人設定類似的目標：簽證會計師被期待藉由交叉銷售非簽證服務，自其簽證客戶事務所賺取高於簽證費用雙倍收入。在如此環境下，擅長行銷之簽證會計師合夥人，即能在事務所獲得發展與晉升機會，但是以技術見長而不擅行銷之合夥人，卻要漸失地位，甚至面臨被辭退之窘境。
  
  By the late 1990s, Ernst & Young set business goals expecting each audit partner to sell related non-audit services to audit clients. Failure to meet these performance targets would result in an automatic 10% pay cut. Andersen also set similar targets for audit partners in 1998, expecting them to earn double the audit fees in non-audit revenue through cross-selling. In such an environment, audit partners skilled in marketing could find opportunities for development and promotion within the firm, while those strong in technical skills but lacking in marketing acumen could lose ground, even facing dismissal.

• 任何對於簽證會計師為何願意對其聲譽資本冒險之解釋，必須將1990年代至2000年初期之市場泡沫因素納入考量。市場泡沫使投資人較不重視過去財務資訊，而較著重於未來資訊的揭露。守門人之聲譽更不受重視。10年間企業持續獲利及股價成長，使投資人喪失自然的懷疑態度，變得不再關心簽證會計師身分以及其聲譽如何。公司客戶也只需要具有最基本聲譽之簽證會計師簽證其財報之正確性，以滿足證券交易委員會之要求。
  
  Any explanation for why audit partners were willing to risk their reputational capital must consider the market bubble factors from the late 1990s to the early 2000s. The market bubble led investors to focus less on past financial information and more on future disclosures. The gatekeepers’ reputations were also less valued. Ten years of continuous corporate profitability and stock price growth caused investors to lose their natural skepticism and become less concerned about the identity and reputation of audit partners. Companies’ clients only required auditors with basic reputations to certify the accuracy of their financial statements, satisfying Securities and Exchange Commission requirements.

《如何「無所事事」》，我忘了是怎麼知道這本書的，但我很清楚知道我是因為被書名吸引而在圖書館預約了這本書。

I forgot how I stumbled upon “How to Do Nothing," but I distinctly remember reserving it at the library because the title intrigued me.

書名很通俗，讓人覺得是本慵懶、慢活的書，但其實這是本不平易近人的書。

The title seemed straightforward, suggesting a book about idleness and leisurely living, but it’s actually quite inaccessible.

書名「無所事事」，並不是真的在講怎麼處在完全不做任何事情的狀態，而是作者對於注意力經濟時代的抗議，對於各大社群媒體奪去眾人思考的時間和空間提出的抵抗。

“Doing Nothing" in the title doesn’t mean advocating for complete inactivity. Instead, it’s the author’s protest against the attention economy era, resisting the dominance of major social media platforms in stealing people’s time and space for reflection.

作者希望眾人能夠多與生活中的自然環境接觸、能面對面與人進行對話，作者認為，對於一件事情的理解需要時間和空間，而現在奪取注意力的平台，讓人們處於被動取得資訊的狀態、讓人們失去脈絡(像是SNS上每個帳號都在講著不同的事情，或是對著同一件事情發表很片面的觀點)。在脈絡崩解的狀態下，我們對於事情經常一知半解，有的只剩下情緒，那個情緒是極端的，甚至自己也說不清楚道理的。

The author encourages reconnecting with nature and engaging in face-to-face conversations in daily life. She argues that understanding something requires time and space, but the platforms that capture attention keep people in a passive state of information consumption, leading to a loss of context and fragmented understanding. In this state of context collapse, people often only grasp half the story, left with only emotions, which can be extreme and irrational.

作者引用許多文獻來闡述她的立場，讀者能透過她反覆辯證的主題掌握她想表達的，即是找回拼湊出自己思維與感受的時間和空間吧，不要被注意力經濟的手段蒙蔽而喪失原初的能動性。

She references numerous sources to elucidate her stance. Through her recurring themes, readers can grasp her message: reclaiming time and space to piece together their own thoughts and feelings without being blinded by the tactics of the attention economy.

讀完這本書覺得較可惜之處在於，她使用的詞句和邏輯較不平易近人，或許她努力疾呼的對象，根本難以理解她闡述的觀點。

Upon finishing the book, I found it unfortunate that the language and logic used were rather inaccessible. Perhaps her intended audience would find it challenging to comprehend her viewpoints.

這本書陳述的觀點我認為不會離《重新與人對話》(Reclaiming Conversation)太遠，這本書比較好讀，如果對這個主題有興趣的，推薦讀這本。

The perspective presented in this book isn’t too far from “Reclaiming Conversation," which is more reader-friendly. If you’re interested in this topic, I recommend reading that book instead.

《如何「無所事事」》結尾的部分，作者提到的這個概念我沒有細想過，但讀完之後覺得很有道理，為什麼我們這麼習慣要求檯面上的人，為了多年前的失言道歉？

In the concluding part of “How to Do Nothing," the concept the author mentions hadn’t crossed my mind before, but after reading, it made perfect sense. Why are we so accustomed to demanding apologies from public figures for remarks made years ago?

• 在大型綜合社交情境中，我們很難向不同的對象展現截然不同的自我定義，因為每一名受眾都看得到很多關於我們的其他資訊。我們也無法在大型綜合社交情境中公開改變主意，也就是隨著時間而展現不同的自我。這是現今社群媒體最荒謬的其中一件事，因為改變主意是正常不過且合乎人性的事，就連大事也不例外。想想你會想跟不論什麼事情都從來不會改變心意的人交朋友嗎？因為在網路上道歉和改變主意常和軟弱畫上等號，我們若不保持緘默，就會冒上被嘲笑的風險。朋友、家人、熟人可以在空間與時間中看著一個人生活及成長，但在群眾眼中只有被期望要像品牌一樣具整體性且不受時間影響的人物。對一個品牌來說，一如公眾人物，改變、模棱兩可，自相矛盾，都是詛咒。馬克．祖克柏的名言：「 你在朋友或同事面前是一種形象，在你認識的其他人面前又有另一種形象的日子馬上就要結束了。有兩種身分就代表你誠信不足。」
  
  In large, integrated social contexts, it’s challenging to present vastly different aspects of ourselves to different audiences because each audience has access to a wealth of information about us. We also can’t openly change our minds in these contexts, showing different sides of ourselves over time. This is one of the most absurd aspects of social media today because changing one’s mind is normal and human, even in significant matters. Imagine wanting to be friends with someone who never changes their mind about anything. Because apologizing and changing one’s mind online are often equated with weakness, speaking up risks being ridiculed. Friends, family, and acquaintances can witness a person’s life and growth over time, but in the eyes of the crowd, one is expected to remain consistent and timeless, like a brand. For both a brand and public figures, change, ambiguity, and contradictions are seen as curses. Mark Zuckerberg’s quote, “The days of you having a different image for your work friends or co-workers and for the other people you know are probably coming to an end pretty quickly. Having two identities for yourself is an example of a lack of integrity."

以下這段或許是全書中「最軟」的文字：

The following passage might be the “softest" in the entire book:

• 無所事事意味擺脫注意力經濟 ，僅為了給自己時間思考，也為了能在其他架構做別的事。我所想像唯一可營造現身空間的健全社交網路是這樣組合：面對面的邂逅；和朋友長長的散步；打電話聊天；封閉的團體聊天；市政會議。這種社交網路會重建我們失去的脈絡，振興時間與地點在我們日常意識中扮演的角色，提供了我們此刻確實存在的地方，作為孵育同理心、負責、政治創新的空間。培養地方感能強化注意力，如果我們想要重新學習如何關心彼此就必須重新學習怎麼關心地方。
  
  Doing nothing means breaking free from the attention economy, simply to give ourselves time to think and to engage in other activities within different frameworks. The only social networks I can imagine that create spaces for genuine presence are as follows: face-to-face encounters; long walks with friends; phone calls; closed-group conversations; town hall meetings. Such social networks would rebuild the context we’ve lost, revitalize the roles that time and place play in our daily consciousness, and provide us with a place where we truly exist, fostering empathy, accountability, and political innovation. Cultivating local affection can strengthen attention. If we want to relearn how to care for each other, we must relearn how to care for our places.

我知道有些人閱讀的方針是，讀了不喜歡就棄讀，但我遇到艱澀的書還是會努力讀完它，通常再艱澀的書，整本讀完後還是會因為反覆浸淫在作者的思路下而有所收穫。

I know some people’s reading policy is to abandon a book if they don’t like it, but I make an effort to finish even difficult books. Usually, after struggling through a challenging book, I find that immersing myself repeatedly in the author’s thoughts yields some rewards.

不放棄堅持讀完是因為我希望下次再碰到同樣類型的書時，我閱讀的速度會因為熟悉而變快，就像我剛開始讀歷史的書時也是舉步維艱，但當累積的點夠多時就能連成線了。現在讀熟悉的年代的歷史書，完全不覺得辛苦，只會因為在同樣的年代中又發掘到了未知的事情而感到開心。

Not giving up and persisting through a book is because I hope that the next time I encounter a similar type of book, my reading speed will increase due to familiarity. It’s like when I first started reading history books, every step was arduous, but when enough points accumulate, they connect into a line. Now, reading history books from familiar eras feels effortless, and I’m only happy to discover unknown facts within the same time period.